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1
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2
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- Identify and characterize possible sources for BSE (or a TSE disease
with similar clinical and pathologic signs as BSE - will refer to as
BSE for brevity) infectivity in U.S. cattle
- Identify and characterize pathways for cattle-derived BSE infectivity
in the U.S. cattle herd or human food supply
- Evaluate implications over time of possible introduction of BSE into US
system
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3
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- HSPH/HCRA
- Group with long history in risk analysis of hazards to human health and
the environment
- Expertise in methods of risk analysis
- Multidisciplinary approach
- TU/CCE
- Expertise in the integration of quantitative modeling, expert systems
and operations research methods in studying the epidemiology of health
systems
- Strong record of work on animal health issues
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4
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- Characterizing knowledge of BSE and other TSEs
- Developing tool to help evaluate the robustness of US protection systems
- Identifying key processes or pathways that influence spread of BSE to
animals or humans if it is introduced to the US system
- Pointing out important data gaps
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5
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- Generating estimate of risk of BSE in US
- Suggesting risk of vCJD in US
- Making policy recommendations
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6
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- Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
- A Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) of cattle
- Fatal neurodegenerative disease characterized by spongiform changes in
the brain
- First recognized in cattle in the Britain in 1986
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7
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- Humans
- Kuru
- Crutzfeld-Jacob Disease (CJD) (nvCJD)
- Fatal Familial Insomnia, etc.
- Animals:
- BSE (cattle)
- Scrapie (sheep and goats)
- Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) (deer and elk)
- Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy (mink)
- Others….
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8
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- All cause fatal spongiform changes in the brain
- Long incubation period
- Pathogenesis poorly understood
- Infectivity often concentrated in CNS tissues
- Infective agent unknown, current hypotheses focus on prions
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9
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10
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11
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- Prevailing hypothesis of UK BSE origin and spread is correct:
- BSE came from scrapie or spontaneous case
- Spread through oral exposure to infective material derived from diseased
animals with some maternal transmission
- UK case born “after the ban” and other examples indicate some
uncertainty in these assumptions
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12
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- Importation ban – cattle and beef
- UK since 1989
- All Europe since 1997
- Prohibit all imports of rendered animal products from Europe
- Interagency Surveillance Program
- BSE Emergency Response Plan
- FDA feed ban
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13
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- Latent period between infection and symptoms
- Changing levels of infectivity
- Changing sites of infectivity
- Many pathways of concern involve circumvention of current rules and
regulations
- Numerous sources of uncertainty and gaps in data
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14
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15
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- Infectivity characterized as cattle oral ID50s
- Use linear model of infectivity with no threshold
- One cattle oral ID50 fed back to cattle will cause 0.5 cases
of disease on average
- No experimental or analytic estimate of threshold
- “Conservative” model in that true dose-response is unlikely to give
higher estimates of risk
- Characterize average situation across the US
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16
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- Importation of infected animals/products
- Transmission from other species
- Spontaneous case
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17
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- We consider importation of infectivity to be unlikely but retain the
ability to model effects of importing infected animals or feed
components
- We model rendering of sheep as potential routes of other TSEs to cattle
feed
- The evaluate but do not model the potential for CWD as a source through
rendering or lateral transmission
- IF spontaneous BSE does occur it is likely at a low rate (approximately
1 detectable case every 7 years in US) and can be included in model
estimates
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18
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- Model different groups of bovines that will have different potential
exposure to BSE infectivity or potential to develop disease
- Beef (production and breeding stock)
- Dairy (production and breeding stock)
- Males and females
- Characterize rates at which different groups are born, die, are
slaughtered
- When BSE is introduced, monitor number of infected and number of
clinical animals
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19
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- Model pathways by which BSE infectivity could enter the US human or
cattle food supply if it were present in a bovine
- Important for understanding dynamics of process and potential for cattle
epidemic or significant human exposure to cattle TSE agent
- Model passes simulated animal through slaughter, rendering, feed
production and farm use of feed
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20
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- Model slaughter and processing for points at which infectivity could
become available for animal or human exposure
- Evaluate “potential human exposure” without explicit consideration of
consumption, waste, and other factors
- Infected tissues not taken for human consumption go to rendering
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21
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- Model progress of infected material through rendering and feed
production
- Some reduction of infectivity in rendering process
- Consider possibility of noncompliance with FDA feed ban - few data to
make confident predictions
- Mislabeling
- Contamination
- Misfeeding on the farm
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22
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- A major concern about occurrence of BSE/TSE is potential for a UK-like
epidemic in the US
- Development of additional cases requires infectivity to get from initial
case to others
- If one case can give rise to more than one new case, an epidemic could
develop. If each case gives rise
to less than one new case, on average, the disease will die out
- The model follows US cattle over time and uses the pathways to move
infectivity into the population
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23
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- The model reflects important attributes for development of BSE/TSE
- Type of bovine (beef or dairy)
- Age of animal
- Susceptibility to infection if exposed
- Feeding practices
- Time since infection
- Development of infectivity
- Slaughter and death rates
- The model reports annual counts of animals, animals that are born, die,
and are slaughtered as well as number of infected animals
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24
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- Age dependence of susceptibility
- Time course of development of infectivity and infectious tissues
- Feeding practices - how much animal protein of what types is fed to
cattle?
- Lesser uncertainties include population demographics
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25
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- Evaluating the response of the US system to an external challenge
- Characterization of important gaps in knowledge or data
- Identification of potential risk management actions
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26
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- We are assessing the potential for BSE/TSE infectivity to spread in the
US dairy/beef cattle population and in the U.S. food supply if it were
to arise here
- Our method of analysis involves definition and characterization of
pathways by which infectivity could enter the herd or food supply
- We have constructed a simulation model to explore the dynamics of BSE
following an introduction and to quantitatively evaluate the relative
risk of specific pathways
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27
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- Our model allows evaluation of the relative contribution of different
pathways to the spread of infectivity to cattle or for potential human
exposure
- The dynamic nature of the model
allows characterization of the likelihood of an epidemic or of the
disease dying out
- The model has many potential applications in BSE risk management
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28
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